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Law has historically been a male-dominated profession. The number of women earning law 
degrees is now close to parity with men (Moyer and Haire 2015). So, does this mean that women 
no longer face disadvantages in the legal profession? Unfortunately, systemic disadvantage 
persists. For instance, previous work on the United States Supreme Court shows that female judges 
and attorneys are more likely to be interrupted than men—a finding consistent with research on 
interruption in other contexts, like legislative bodies. This frequency of interruption can have 
lasting consequences on the ways in which women speak and present questions, as well as more 
generally how women are able to communicate and express their perspectives.  My research 
examines the gender dynamics of interruptions in a new institutional context: oral arguments in 
the United States Courts of Appeals. I look at whether female judges are interrupted more 
frequently by attorneys than their male counterparts, and whether male or female judges are more 
likely to interrupt attorneys. The results reveal that male judges are much more likely to interrupt 
attorneys, consistent with existing research, which suggests that male judges dominate more of the 
conversation during oral argument, potentially limiting the influence of female judges. Further, the 
results reveal that there is not a statistically significant difference between the interruption of 
female and male judges by attorneys, in contrast to existing research, and suggests that attorneys 

















The Influence of Gender on Interruptions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
 “To be a woman is to be interrupted.” The Boston Globe made this declaration after then 
Senator Kamala Harris was repeatedly interrupted by her male colleagues when questioning 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions. Now Vice President Kamala Harris is unfortunately the rule 
rather than the exception. Women in the highest echelons of their careers experience consistent 
interruption and forms of disrespect. This has also been found to be true in the United States 
Supreme Court, as will be discussed below. 
This research looks at the interruption patterns and power dynamics in the form of oral 
argument before the United States Courts of Appeals. This study is important because it takes the 
limited research conducted on the Supreme Court a step further to see if gender inequities are 
consistent in the lower federal court system. This is relevant in order to understand the 
disadvantages women face in the legal profession and how that may affect the shaping of policy. 
Female judges, while limited in number, have the opportunity to shape the trajectory of the 
American legal system. If the already disadvantaged position of women in the legal system and 
the world is further perpetuated by disproportionate interruption, it is important to expand on this 
research in order to combat it. 
First, I will highlight the current body of research on gender dynamics and interruption: 
looking first more generally at instances of male interruption of females in normal conversation 
and day-to-day interactions. Then, I consider how the insights from this work have been tested in 
a variety of political institutions, including legislative bodies both in the United States and 
abroad, as well as the United States Supreme Court and federal courts in other countries. 
However, no existing research has assessed whether these findings translate to the lower federal 
courts. Drawing from the existing literature, I posit two hypotheses, which I test using an original 
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dataset. I argue that the existing research may apply to the U.S. Courts of Appeals system, and 
test whether female judges are interrupted more frequently by attorneys and whether male judges 
interrupt attorneys more frequently than female judges do. Finally, I discuss what the findings 
can tell us about future research on this topic and the overall landscape of the American legal 
system. While my findings do not establish a disproportionate pattern of interruption of female 
judges by attorneys in the 4th Circuit of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, they do support the idea that 
male judges are markedly more likely to interrupt attorneys during oral argument, thus speaking 
more, and potentially having a greater impact on the decision reached.  I believe this topic 
provides the opportunity for greater analysis and understanding of the way women are treated in 
the judiciary. 
 
The Foundations of Gendered Interruption Patterns 
 Women have historically been, and continue to be, disadvantaged in the workplace, and 
in the legal profession specifically.  Considering that a relatively recent example like the late 
United States Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was not able to find legal work after 
graduating from an elite law school (West 2018), one can easily see the lasting influences gender 
discrimination and bias has on modern women.  Women are often dismissed and looked over if 
they are not bold enough, but consistently ridiculed and labeled as aggressive if they stand their 
ground.  This is representative of a concept in feminist philosophy known as the double bind: 
“situations in which options are reduced to a very few and all of them expose one to penalty, 
censure, or deprivation” (Frye 1983). In this theory of double bind, for example, if women accept 
their traditional gender stereotype of agreeability and docility, they miss out on opportunities to 
contribute, but if women go against gender norms by exhibiting strong opinions and thoughts, 
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they are perceived as angry, bitter, or aggressive. This places women in a “lose-lose” situation, in 
which the double bind perpetuates disadvantage. As Frye describes, “one can only choose to risk 
one’s preferred form and rate of annihilation.” Balancing this challenging dynamic may hurt 
female attorney success and damage their credibility.  
 One federal taskforce concluded, “women attorneys face credibility problems not found 
by their male counterparts. This is a cause for concern, because credibility is directly related to 
one’s ability to influence others” (Nelson 1993–1994:733). This struggle for balancing 
credibility with approval places women within strict boundaries for behavior which men do not 
face.  Further, in the legal profession specifically, women face an additional barrier to success.  
Because of widely held associations between masculine-associated traits and law, female 
attorneys are disadvantaged when people perceive “feminine” behavior as deviating from the 
stereotypical lawyer role (Pierce 1995; Rhode 2002).  
 These challenges contribute to the power dynamics between men and women, both 
within the legal sphere and outside of it.  Interruptions are a relevant aspect of studying these 
dynamics because they constitute a way to assert authority in conversation.  Where a dominant 
party may speak over or interrupt the other person, this creates a dynamic of power within 
conversation.  This dynamic can contribute to the way in which the conversation goes, and how 
decisions are made from it.  This is especially true within the legal sector, and notably in oral 
arguments.  When a woman judge is interrupted, her authority is challenged, her thought 
interrupted, and the potential for her to influence the decision being made is contested. An 
example of interruption in the government sector is when, on October 7, 2020, Vice Presidential 
Candidate Kamala Harris was interrupted by current Vice President Mike Pence during a debate.  
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Harris interjected “Mr. Vice President, I’m speaking” and received major media coverage1. The 
research below elaborates on different power dynamics in conversation, both within social and 
professional contexts. 
First, one body of work finds evidence of women experiencing interruptions in 
conversation with male counterparts.  These are general studies of men and women in the 
workplace, but they help build the foundation to support the assertion that women Supreme 
Court justices are more often interrupted by men. For instance, Zimmerman and West (1996), 
observe that “…there are definite and patterned ways in which the power and dominance enjoyed 
by men in other contexts are exercised in their conversational interaction with women.” This 
specific study found that of conversations between two women, two men, and a man and a 
woman, the male/female groups had a disproportionate number of interruptions as compared to 
the same sex groups, and nearly all of the interruptions were made by men. These findings are 
consistent with insights from feminist philosophy from Solnit (2014), who writes about the 
power dynamics and presumption of superiority in her article, “Men Explain Things to Me.” As 
Solnit describes, an underlying assumption often exists in conversation between men and 
women. This presumption is that men are more credible, knowledgeable, or capable; thus, “men 
explain things to me, and other women, whether or not they know what they’re talking about” 
(Solnit 2014). She goes on that “it is this presumption that makes it hard, at times, for any 
woman in any field; that keeps women from speaking up and from being heard when they dare; 
 
1 Harris received substantial support, especially among women, following her retort to the Vice 
President’s interruption.  A potential explanation of this support is relatability, as women may 
empathize based on their own experiences being interrupted.  Further, according to a CBS News 
tally of this same debate, Pence interrupted Harris twice as many times (O’Kane 2020). 
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that crushes young women into silence by indicating, the way harassment on the street does, that 
this is not their world” (Solnit 2014).  
We see the challenges discussed by Solnit in various settings. Zimmerman and West’s 
findings are supported by numerous other studies of interruptions in conversations between men 
and women in groups and social contexts (Karakowsky 2004; Hancock and Rubin 2014) and in 
professional settings like legislative bodies (Kathlene 1994). Each of these studies supports the 
idea that there is an unequal power dynamic between men and women in conversation, as well as 
in the workplace. 
Moreover, there is research to support interruption of women, even in the highest echelon 
of their careers. Several sources analyze legislative bodies and the gender dynamics in speech 
within these institutions2. For instance, one study found that when presenting female and male 
witnesses in legislative hearings, women are given proportionally less time to speak than male 
witnesses and the effectiveness of women's testimony is undermined by senators' responses 
(Mattei 1998). The research of a previously mentioned study of legislative bodies suggests that 
as the proportion of women increases in a legislative body, men become more verbally 
aggressive and controlling of the hearing (Kathlene 1994).  Further, in studying the U.S. 
Supreme Court confirmation process, strong evidence indicated that female nominees receive 
more judicial philosophy‐related questions from male senators, and that, overall, female 
 
2 This is a concern also identified in feminist philosophy, as described by Dotson (2011). Dotson 
explains this with the concept of epistemic violence, or the violence exerted against or through 
knowledge. Dotson describes epistemic violence as a way of marking the silence of marginalized 
groups. Applying this theory to my study, epistemic violence is an interesting consideration for 
understanding how unequal treatment of women in their careers perpetuates future unequal 
treatment. Perhaps, since women have vastly different experiences in their careers than men, 
these challenges could “silence” women, as epistemic violence asserts, by creating fear and 
keeping more women from participating in these career opportunities. 
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nominees undergo a substantively different confirmation process than male nominees (Collins, 
Ringhand, and Boyd 2018). Studies have also been conducted on the topic of interruption and 
gender dynamics in other countries: one in the German legislative body analyzed the problem of 
‘manterrupting’ regarding parliamentary debates in Germany by investigating the nature and 
extent of male interruptions during parliamentary debates. These instances demonstrate that 
disadvantages persist for women in their careers. Further, if women are continuing to face 
inequities in their careers, one wonders how the imbalances are perpetuated by the unequal 
system in place. In sum, there is substantial evidence for the level of interruption of women 
within legislative bodies, as well as the power dynamics which exist within these institutions. 
The dynamics present within the legislative branch of government could very naturally translate 
to the judicial branch. 
These studies all demonstrate the frequency of males interrupting females in conversation 
and professional settings and support the premise that this could be applicable to oral arguments 
in front of the United States Courts of Appeals. One could argue that women at the pinnacle of 
their career in the highest court in the nation could not possibly be affected by this. However, I 
believe there is an argument for how the societal norm of interrupting women could be translated 
to any line of work or institution. 
 
Gendered Interactions on Courts 
In addition to work on interruptions in conversation and legislative bodies, other research 
examines interruptions in judicial proceedings, both in the United States and in other nations. 
Research about gender and interruptions in the judicial context can be organized into four 
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categories: interruptions between judges and attorneys, interruptions between justices, gender 
differences in speech strategies, and other explanations for interruption patterns.  
 
Interruptions between judges and attorneys 
 First, several studies substantiate the hypothesis that female judges are disproportionately 
interrupted by advocates before the Court compared to their male counterparts (Loughland 2019; 
Jacobi and Schweers 2019). Even despite rules of oral argument prohibiting the interruption of 
justices, research has demonstrated that advocates before the Court do interrupt justices, and 
interrupt female justices significantly more often. One study (Loughland 2019) conducted on 
behavior during oral argument in the High Court of Australia considers factors like amount of 
time spent speaking and seniority. Ultimately, it finds that female judges were far more likely to 
be interrupted than their male colleagues. While this research applies to the Australian High 
Court, it supports the idea that this could be true for the United States Supreme Court.3   
There has also been research conducted on the treatment and frequency of judges 
interrupting female attorneys (Gleason 2019; Patton and Smith 2017; Patton and Smith 2020). 
This research has looked at how gender schemas and the expectations and norms associated with 
gender both influence the power dynamics within oral argument and the ways that this relates to 
interruption. For instance, Patton and Smith (2017) find that female lawyers are interrupted 
earlier, allowed to speak for less time between interruptions, and subjected to more and longer 
 
3 There are some institutional differences between the Australian and United States Supreme 
Courts.  The Australian High Court is made up of seven justices rather than nine, it requires a 
mandatory retirement by age seventy as compared to a lifetime appointment, and it has both 
original and appellate jurisdiction over cases (West 2018). But for the purposes of this paper, the 
findings can be generalized. These differences do not affect the point at issue. 
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speeches by the justices compared to their male counterparts. Further, Gleason (2019) finds that 
female attorneys are more successful when adhering to the gender norm of emotional language, 
where male attorneys are rewarded for using less emotional language. These studies support the 
idea that gender norms and stereotypes are reinforced in oral argument, and that this can 
influence who speaks, for how long they speak, and how they are treated while speaking. 
Whether the study looks at the interruption of judges by attorneys or attorneys by judges, the 
body of research is consistent in that female judges and attorneys are consistently interrupted 
more frequently and treated differently in oral argument than their male counterparts.  
 
Interruptions between justices 
 Research on the rates of interruption between Supreme Court justices demonstrate 
another perspective of power dynamics within oral argument. Not only are female justices more 
likely to be interrupted by attorneys before the Court, but they are also far more likely to be 
interrupted by male justices, and gender is the most significant factor affecting interruptive 
behavior (Feldman and Gill 2019; Jacobi and Schweers 2017; Loughland 2019). According to 
the Feldman and Gill (2019) study, “this inequity is compounded by the fact that interruptions of 
female justices by male justices are associated with lower word counts for the interrupted female 
justices in ways that interruptions by other women are not.” This knowledge is important 
because it demonstrates the disparity in balance of authority on the Supreme Court and how 
gender impacts which members of the Court influence oral argument. Further, this dynamic is 
interesting because interruption is not changed when it is a high-stakes situation such as oral 
argument or between colleagues in a professional setting such as the Supreme Court. Moreover, 
it has been found that this pattern of interruption is not changed with the addition of more female 
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justices (Jacobi and Schweers 2017). While the United States Supreme Court has had a limited 
pool of female justices to study, it is interesting to note that as time elapses and more women 
have been nominated to the Court, power dynamics and interruption patters have remained 
consistent. Additionally, the Australian High Court did not see a change in the pattern even with 
a female chief justice (Loughland 2019).  
 
Beyond interruptions 
Furthermore, many scholars have looked at the differences between speech patterns of 
men and women (Gleason 2020; Jacobi and Schweers 2017; Ainsworth 1993).  These speech 
strategies are important because they play a role in the power dynamics present in oral argument. 
Jacobi and Schweers (2017) found female justices to use what linguists and psychologists call 
the “female register,” which is a style of speaking in which women frequently use questions or 
overly polite language to modify a statement.  This style relies on the use of indirect phrases such 
as ‘sorry,’ ‘could I ask,’ or the use of an advocate’s name by female judges at the beginning of a 
question. Other work has found fundamental differences between women’s and men’s speech, 
finding hyper-politeness tendencies in women, and over-assertiveness in men (Ainsworth 1993).  
An example of this is that women were found to be more likely to use indirect language such as 
‘sort of,’ ‘probably,’ and ‘kind of,’ in addition to declarative statements with rising intonation as 
opposed to direct questions.  
Research has not determined whether this is because the female speaking style is easier to 
interrupt or because women adopt this style as a result of being interrupted frequently. This is 
relevant to my study because it potentially demonstrates one way that women accommodate 
interruptions. The female register may allow for more frequent interruption by nature of the use 
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of passive language, such as using “pardon me, excuse me, may I ask” before asking a question. 
Moreover, the Gleason article (2020) demonstrated attorneys are more successful when their oral 
arguments are more consistent with gender norms. Specifically, male attorneys are rewarded for 
using less emotional language whereas female attorneys are successful when using more 
emotional language. This further depicts the influence of gender norms and expectations on 
power dynamics, even in the highest levels of our judiciary. The way in which women speak, 
and are expected to speak, has a demonstrated effect on the way they are treated, even in a 
context like the federal court system.  
 
Other explanations for interruption patterns 
 Finally, several studies have analyzed other explanations than gender that might explain 
frequency of interruption (Jacobi and Schweers 2017; Loughland 2019; Patton and Smith 2020). 
Factors other than gender, such as ideology and seniority, have been offered as potential 
explanations for rates of interruption (Johnson, Black, and Wedeking 2009; Epstein, Landes, and 
Posner 2010). The analysis of these factors on the Supreme Court is somewhat challenging 
because there have only ever been four female Supreme Court justices, and the appointment of 
Justice Amy Coney Barrett is too recent to gather sufficient data. Another difficulty in studying 
ideology is that Justice Sandra Day O’Connor is the only conservative justice of the four 
females. Further, Justices O’Connor and Ginsburg were the only two female justices considered 
to be senior at this point. These factors limit the study of ideology and seniority as potential 
explanations, but they can still offer some insight into the interaction of these factors. The Jacobi 
and Schweers (2017) study discusses the influence of both ideology and seniority on the 
likelihood of justices being interrupted. While they found that liberal justices are more likely to 
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be interrupted, a conservative female justice like Justice O’Connor was still disproportionately 
likely to be interrupted. Seniority was found to not explain the gender pattern. Moreover, the 
same study found the pattern did not change with the addition of more female justices. 
Loughland (2019) found that a gendered pattern of interruption on the High Court in Australia 
did not change with the presence of a female chief justice. Additionally, another study 
investigated the specific effects of ideology and gender in verbal interactions during Supreme 
Court oral arguments. Patton and Smith (2020) theorized that all justices—just like all people— 
have unconscious gender schemas, or an organized set of gender-related beliefs that influence 
behavior, that lead them to speak more during presentations by women but that liberal and 
female justices likely have conscious egalitarian values that diminish the manifestation of gender 
schemas. They found that conservative justices speak more when female lawyers are arguing but 
that liberal justices show no such effect. While several studies have undertaken studying the 
influence of factors like ideology and seniority, none have been able to demonstrate a complete 
explanation replacing the influence of gender.  
In summary, there is limited research on this subject, in large part because there were no 
women on the United States Supreme Court before 1981.  Even now, there are only three women 
sitting on the nine-person bench. Despite the limited research on this subject, this idea is 
supported by earlier research on general interruptions and treatment of women.  Further, studies 
on this topic in other countries can contribute and support these ideas.  Overall, a history of 
inequity for women supports the hypothesis that gender influences the likelihood that someone 
would be interrupted.  Research on this topic at the Courts of Appeals would further contribute to 
the studies above, and could have a major impact on our understanding of the judicial system and 
how women are treated within it.  
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Institutional Differences Between the U.S. Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 
Another important consideration when applying this research question to the United 
States Courts of Appeals is the many differences between the appellate courts and the U.S. 
Supreme Court. It is important to note these differences and consider how they might impact the 
findings of this study. The appeals courts are divided into thirteen total circuits: there are eleven 
geographical circuits that comprise all the federal districts within a contiguous group of from 
three to nine states, plus the districts in various U.S. territories. A twelfth circuit hears appeals 
from the district court of the District of Columbia and from a number of federal administrative 
agencies. A final circuit, the Federal Circuit, sits in the District of Columbia and has a 
specialized jurisdiction, which includes customs and patent appeals (Bowie, Songer, and Szmer 
2014). Notably, the U.S. Courts of Appeals have a significantly larger case load, lack a 
discretionary docket, have a random, rotating three-member panel as compared to the nine-
member Supreme Court, and there are differences between the circuits as to what percentage of 
cases are decided with oral argument. Research conducted on the appellate courts by Bowie, 
Songer, and Szmer (2014) elaborate on these differences as follows. These structural differences 
between the U.S. Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court are important in understanding 
differences in my findings. Because the court systems operate differently, there are 
considerations for how this might influence the findings of interruption on the Courts of Appeals, 
as compared to the Supreme Court. 
First, the U.S. Courts of Appeals, as the intermediary between federal trial courts and the 
Supreme Court, hear a significantly larger number of cases each year compared to the Supreme 
Court. According to Bowie et. al (2014), “for most of the past decade the courts of appeals have 
been deciding more than 60,000 cases per year, while Supreme Court review of U.S. Courts of 
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Appeals decisions has dropped to less than 150 cases per year.” Further, Bowie et. al state “But 
as the number of appeals has increased dramatically in recent decades, while the number of cases 
heard by the Supreme Court has remained the same, the courts of appeals have increasingly 
become in practice the courts of last resort for the vast majority of litigants.” In fact, in 2019-
2020, the Supreme Court heard only fifty-six cases, which was the smallest number since the 
Civil War era (Feldman 2020).  In the view of these authors, the appellate courts have become 
even more important in recent years because of this discrepancy.  This could, perhaps, be an 
interesting component in the research conducted: giving more female Courts of Appeals judges 
the opportunity to be interrupted, as well as their interruptions potentially having more impact on 
the breadth of decisions made.  
Second, unlike the United States Supreme Court, the U.S. Courts of Appeals do not have 
a discretionary docket. This means that appellate courts are unable to be selective of which cases 
they choose to hear; instead, they must hear all appeals by nature of their position as an 
intermediary court. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, is able to select which cases it will 
hear each year because these cases have already received the “review of an adverse decision 
reached at trial” required by common law (Bowie, Songer, and Szmer 2014). The U.S. Courts of 
Appeals function to provide a review of lower court proceedings and are required to hear 
appeals, where the Supreme Court may or may not choose to do so. This is an important 
distinction in the function of each court system. One potential implication of this difference is 
that the cases before the U.S. Courts of Appeals are not as ideologically salient or high stakes as 
the cases before the Supreme Court. It could be possible that, given the lower stakes, the pressure 
to interrupt might be lower. However, this would likely not have an impact on the gendered 
patterns of interruption mentioned above. 
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Next, the structure of the U.S. Courts of Appeals and Supreme Court are different: The 
Supreme Court has a standing body of nine justices, whereas in the US Courts of Appeals, “Each 
circuit is presided over by between six and twenty-nine full-time appeals court judges, who 
typically sit in panels of three judges to decide their appeals” (Bowie, Songer, and Szmer 2014). 
Where the Supreme Court utilizes the entire pool of judges in each case and oral argument, each 
circuit in the Courts of Appeals uses a random panel of three judges per case. Depending on the 
size of the circuit, these judges may have never met or worked together previously. This could 
potentially influence the conclusions above. Oral argument is influenced by the power dynamics 
present within relationships between attorneys and judges: the familiarity and acquaintance of 
the panel of judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals could influence the way conversation, and 
decision-making, transpires. 
Finally, there are substantial differences across the circuits of the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
as to what percentage of cases is decided with oral argument. Each circuit has discretion in 
deciding certain procedures, and one of these discretionary decisions is how often cases will be 
decided with oral argument. Bowie et. al (2014) analyzed the frequency of oral argument within 
each circuit: as low as 15.3% in the Fourth Circuit and as high as 58.8% in the Seventh Circuit. 
The average frequency of oral argument was approximately 32.53%, making the Fourth Circuit 
significantly below the average. The data in this project is taken from the Fourth Circuit. Thus, 
this variation matters, specifically for this research question, because the rate of interruption 
studied here is taken from oral argument. Consequently, circuits which utilize oral argument 
more frequently may demonstrate increased instances of interruption. It is also interesting to 
wonder how interruption and power dynamics may influence the conclusions reached in oral 
argument, and whether the frequency of oral argument has any impact on this. 
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In summary, the U.S. Courts of Appeals are a distinct court system and its distinction 
from the Supreme Court may be relevant to the study aforementioned. It is important to take the 
systematic differences into consideration when analyzing potential influences on the results 
found. 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
 Previous research on gender and interruption points to several key ideas that have 
implications for this study. First, men interrupt women more frequently in social settings and 
day-to-day interaction. This provides a baseline level of support not only that women are 
interrupted more frequently, but also that men do more of the interrupting. Second, women are 
interrupted more frequently in professional settings. This supports the idea that the disadvantages 
women face permeate into a woman’s career. Next, women are more frequently interrupted in 
positions of authority. This is demonstrated by the example of the Vice-Presidential debate with 
Kamala Harris: even in the highest echelon of her career, Harris faced frequent interruption. 
More than this, Harris was interrupted twice as often as she interrupted her opponent: supporting 
the theory that men also interrupt more frequently than women. This further supports the 
contention that a woman who is a federal judge could still face these disadvantages. Finally, 
work on the Supreme Court confirms that female Supreme Court justices are interrupted more 
frequently than their male colleagues. This final piece of the puzzle offers support for the theory 
that female judges for the United States Courts of Appeals could face disproportionate levels of 




H1: Male judges will interrupt attorneys more than female judges. 
 
H2: Female judges will be interrupted by attorneys more than their male counterparts. 
 
Data and Variables 
To test these hypotheses, I first obtained oral argument data from a stratified random 
sample of sixty published decisions (thirty from each circuit-year) made by the 4th Circuit of the 
United States Courts of Appeals in 2009 and 20164.  These decisions were drawn from 
previously collected data. Of these cases, twenty-nine were orally argued on panels with a mix of 
male and female judges. Audio files for each case were downloaded from the Fourth Circuit 
website, segmented for automated transcription, and then edited by human transcriptionists. 
Lastly, each speaker was identified and coded for their role (attorney or judge) and gender, based 
on information from court filings.  From the textual transcriptions of oral argument proceedings, 
substantive interruptions in oral argument were identified. A “substantive interruption” is 
indicated when the transcript reflects a speaker not being able to finish their though or sentence 
due to another speaker initiating spoken words. When this occurred, the following speech would 
be considered an interruption. In this study, interjections of one word or unidentifiable speech 
were not counted as substantive interruption. For instance, in EEOC v. Central Wholesalers (573 
F.3d 167, 2009), this exchange was coded as a judge interrupting an attorney:  
 
 
4 Data for this project were collected with support from the National Science Foundation (NSF-
SES #1655159, 1654614, 1654559, 1654697). Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or 
recommendations expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the National Science Foundation. 
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Attorney: “We argued the case Your Honor and I think it'd be fair to look at them 
separately because. Certainly in this case the evidence we think establishes or at least a 
reasonable jury could find that there was both a race based. If you just look at the 
evidence—” 
Judge: “I understand that. But let's just say we don't agree with you on that and we don't 
agree that you win on either one independent then you lose.” 
 
Then, in Ojo v. Lynch (813 F.3d 533, 2016) an exchange was coded as an attorney 
interrupting a judge:  
 
Judge: “They … had a broad rule in effect and that's what they applied. Cariaga or 
whatever they want to call it, right. They said we don't abide by nunc pro tunc orders in 
adoption cases.  Which means we don't care what any of the 50 states do. We aren't 
going to record out--” 
Attorney: “Which is the argument. That's why they overstepped.” 
 
Because this data is preliminary, we do not have the ability to control for attorney gender 
at this point5. However, this leaves open possibility for future research. Additionally, future 
research will examine interruption behavior on all-male and all-female panels as well.  
 
5 However, the vast majority of attorneys at oral argument are men. In the 4th Circuit in 2009, 
there were fifteen women out of sixty-six attorneys (22.7%). In 2016, there were fourteen 
women out of sixty-five attorneys (21.5%). These numbers represent attorneys who were on the 
brief, and not necessarily the individuals who argued behind the podium. This is notable, as over 




Next, we look to the details of the data used and my findings in this study.  Table 1 shows 
the summary statistics for each variable. The cases in my study covered a variety of legal 
subjects, but the cases were primarily about civil rights (37.93%), criminal law (20.69%), and 
economic activity and regulation (20.69%). In addition, of the sixty cases, three-quarters of them 
came from panels where both Democratic and Republican judges sat together. This is a relevant 
consideration as we recall previous studies on the influence of ideology on interruption. 
[Table 1 here] 
First, I examine the distribution of interruptions descriptively by creating box plots. As 
demonstrated by Figure 1, the gender differences in judge interruptions of attorneys are 
substantial. This is demonstrated by the difference in height of the box plots representing each 
gender. While the minimum number of interruptions for both male and female judges was zero, 
the maximums are notably different: the maximum for male judges was thirty-one, whereas the 
maximum for female judges was nineteen. Further, the medians of the two groups (nine for 
males and five for females), as indicated by the line inside the box, were different. This suggests 
that my hypothesized expectation is on target: I predicted men would be more active in 
interruption, which is what their higher median indicates. The median is an indicator of what is 
“typical” and is not affected by outliers. 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Male judges exhibited greater variation in interruption of attorneys than women, as 
shown by the interquartile range (25th – 75th percentile), and when the standard deviation is 
calculated; the standard deviation for men was 7.9, but only 4.8 for women. 
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Next, I look at the box plot of attorneys interrupting judges (by judge gender), as 
demonstrated in Figure 2. This type of interruption occurs less frequently than the judge-to-
attorney interruption demonstrated in Figure 1. Both of the maximum values and medians 
indicate that this occurs less frequently. This also makes sense, given the power dynamics in an 
attorney-judge relationship (attorneys are expected to be deferential to judges).  While Figure 2 
shows male judges have greater variation than female judges in being interrupted, the medians 
are the same, which suggests that this hypothesis may not be supported by the t-test. However, 
while the gender of the attorney is not captured in this coding, a vast majority of attorneys who 
appear in federal court are males, which reflects interruptions by mainly male attorneys. 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
While descriptive analyses are informative, they are not sufficient to test my hypotheses, 
which is why I use t-tests. T-tests compare the means of two groups and often tell us whether 
two groups are statistically different from one another. This type of test demonstrates if the 
means of two groups are statistically significant. This is a good tool for testing my hypothesis 
about gender and interruption because I am comparing two groups (men and women) to tell 
whether they are different regarding frequency of interrupting. Using a t-test allows me to see 
whether the difference in interruptions is statistically significant. 
In the t-test I conducted regarding judge gender, male judges interrupted attorneys more 
frequently (M=10.4, SD=7.9) than female judges did (M=5.4, SD=4.8), t(28) =  2.7782, p= 
0.0096.  With this information, I can reject the null hypothesis of no difference. The results for 
H1 support my hypothesis that male judges will interrupt attorneys more than female judges. 
There is a large difference between the means of the two groups, as demonstrated by Figure 3, 
with male judges interrupting attorneys about twice as much as female judges. 
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[Figure 3 here] 
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the ideology of judges can also influence 
interruption patterns, based on Supreme Court research (Jacobi and Schweers 2017; Patton and 
Smith 2020; Epstein, Landes, and Posner 2010). To assess this alternate explanation for gender 
differences in judge interruptions, I conducted another t-test to see if there is a gender difference 
in judge interruptions when comparing mixed Republican and Democratic panels with politically 
homogenous (all Republican or all Democratic) panels. The t-test showed that while male judges 
interrupted attorneys more frequently than women in both mixed and homogeneous panels, the 
difference on homogeneous panels was not statistically significant. In panels with judges from 
the same party, male judges interrupted more frequently (M=8.33, SD=7.42) than female judges 
(M=4.66, SD=3.08), t (1.2875), p=0.2543. Because the p-value is greater than 0.05, this finding 
is not statistically significant. However, when looking at the interruptions of mixed party panels, 
the findings did achieve significance. Male judges not only interrupted more frequently 
(M=10.33, SD=7.48) than female judges (M=5.52, SD=5.17), t (2.3289), p=0.0305, but because 
the p-value is less than 0.05, the results are statistically significant. This suggests that the results 
of H1 are not being driven by ideological factors, though a larger sample would be needed to 
verify this. 
As shown in Figure 4, I also conducted a t-test to evaluate the second hypothesis: whether 
female judges will be interrupted by attorneys more than their male counterparts. In this test, the 
results were not statistically significant: attorneys actually interrupted male judges slightly more 
(M=2.41, SD=3.27) than female judges (M=2, SD=2.22), t (28) = 0.5666, p=0.5755. With this 
information, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference for H2. The p-value equating to 
greater than 0.05 translates to the means not having a great enough difference to be relevant.  
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[Figure 4 here] 
As I did with the first hypothesis, I examined whether gender differences were evident 
when the panels were broken down by party composition. This t-test showed that in one-party 
panels, attorneys interrupt male judges (M=4.17, SD=5.67) much more than female judges 
(M=2.67, SD=2.42), t (0.6237), p=0.5601. However, these results were not statistically 
significant. In mixed party panels, attorneys interrupt female judges (M=2, SD=2.21) slightly 
more than male judges (M=1.81, SD=2.06), t (-0.2752), p=0.7860), but again these findings are 
not statistically significant. 
In the final section, I discuss what these findings tell us and point to directions for future 
research on these questions. 
 
Conclusion 
My research examined the gender dynamics of interruptions in the institutional context of 
oral arguments in the United States Courts of Appeals. I looked at whether female judges are 
interrupted more frequently by attorneys than their male counterparts, and whether male or 
female judges are more likely to interrupt attorneys. This research is important and relevant to 
the future of women in the American legal system. My work also connects to a broader literature 
in feminist theory about patriarchal systems, the double bind, and mansplaining (Solnit 2014; 
Dotson 2011; Frye 1983). Better understanding gendered power dynamics, and how they 
influence important professional settings like the federal court system, will allow our society to 
better comprehend how systematic gender inequality persists in spheres like the legal system. 
 While my findings do not establish a disproportionate pattern of interruption of female 
judges by attorneys in the 4th Circuit of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, they do support the idea that 
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male judges are markedly more likely to interrupt attorneys during oral argument, thus speaking 
more, and potentially having a greater impact on the decision reached. Further, my research did 
not find the influence of ideology on interruption to be statistically significant. This is consistent 
with previous literature which indicates ideology is a somewhat weaker predictor of judicial 
outcomes at the U.S. Courts of Appeals level than at the Supreme Court level (Zorn and Bowie 
2010). 
As Jacobi and Schweers (2019) note in their findings: “It is essential that women have an 
equal opportunity to question advocates, for many reasons…As others have noted, the 
discussions at oral arguments serve many purposes, including: focusing the Justices’ minds, 
helping them gather information to reach decisions as close as possible to their desired outcomes, 
helping them make informed decisions, and providing an opportunity to communicate and 
persuade their colleagues.” The interactions that occur between judges and attorneys in oral 
argument are critical to the results of the proceedings and the shaping of policy. Perhaps the 
reason that I found male judges to interrupt attorneys more, but that the reverse was not true with 
attorneys interrupting female judges more, is because male judges dominate the conversation so 
much that attorneys are rebutting in an attempt to respond to the interruption by male judges. It 
would make sense that attorneys before the Court, in an attempt to answer judges’ questions and 
make their argument, are responding to the interruption by male judges with interruptive 
statements. By nature of interruption, there must be some overlap of statements when attorneys 
are being frequently interrupted. This theory has the potential to explain why attorneys interrupt 
male judges slightly more. Overall, this poses an interesting question: whether male judges 
dominate the conversation in oral argument so much that female judges are less able to impact it. 
My findings demonstrate that male judges interrupt attorneys nearly twice as much as female 
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judges do. If male judges interrupt substantively more, they are more likely to control the 
conversation occurring in oral argument. This domination by male judges has the potential to 
determine the course of the argument, thereby influencing the decision reached and the policy 
imposed. 
 Moreover, my research is just a small snapshot into the vast potential for study that are 
the United States Courts of Appeals. I had the opportunity to conduct this study on the 4th Circuit 
of the U.S. Courts of Appeals in two years: 2009 and 2016. Notably, these two years bookend 
the Obama era, in which the composition of the 4th Circuit dramatically shifted with a record 
number of female appointees. Which, according to experts, has initiated an ideological shift on 
the 4th Circuit: “What was, a few short years ago, the most stridently conservative Court of 
Appeals in the country, has become—since 2010—a moderate, if not slightly liberal, court” 
(Clarke 2015). The shift in ideology on the 4th Circuit is highly relevant for the study of gendered 
interactions and interruption patterns. 
Not only is there opportunity for growth in this study within other years of the 4th Circuit, 
but this research could be expanded to the other twelve circuits not yet studied. One of the main 
attractions of this study is that expanding theories of interruption and gender dynamics to the 
Courts of Appeals provides a much broader pool of study than the Supreme Court. According to 
the Federal Judicial Center, in 2020, 27% of federal appellate judges are female (388 out of 
1,046). Three hundred and eighty-eight female judges to study offer a much wider breadth than 
the four female judges on the Supreme Court who have served long enough to provide data on 
their tenure. Expanding this research to other circuits and years will broaden the scope of the 
findings and paint a broader picture of the challenges that federal female judges face. The power 
dynamics between male and female judges and attorneys very well may be different between 
 26 
circuits, and even years. A limitation of my study is the small number of cases examined within 
only the 4th Circuit. Perhaps, with more cases and more variation across circuits and years, this 
research could be expanded, and potentially find different results with regard to the level of 
interruption of female judges. 
Further, this research could be expanded upon by factoring in the gender of the attorneys 
in these interactions. As previously mentioned, we know that the large majority of the attorneys 
in my study were male. Future research knowing the gender of the attorney and analyzing it, in 
addition to the gender of the judge, could provide further insight into gender dynamic and 
interruption theories. This would offer an important contribution to understand what it is like to 
be a woman attorney coming before a federal court. Previous research indicates that female 
attorneys are rewarded for subscribing to a traditional female gender schema, indicating their 
presentation before federal courts is not treated equally to male attorneys (Gleason 2019; Patton 
and Smith 2017; Patton and Smith 2020). Future studies expanding on the gendered interactions 
of attorneys with the gendered interactions of judges would further contribute to what is known 
about gendered power dynamics. 
 While some research has been conducted on this topic in other institutions, like 
legislative bodies, there is great potential to expand on analysis of interruption and gender 
dynamics in state legislatures and local government institutions, as well as court systems. This 
research could be broken down into legislative committees and specific hearings, as well as 
looking at the relationships and dynamics in these institutions. Often, legislative hearings entail 
the questioning of a witness, which offers a different view of power dynamics.  The institutions 
in which interruption occurs demonstrate varying findings. This is made clear by my research: 
we do not see the same pattern of interruption of female judges as we do on the United States 
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Supreme Court. Perhaps, this is an indicator of the institutional differences we see between these 
court systems: the Supreme Court is potentially hearing cases of greater ideological salience with 
a greater impact on public policy. Additionally, the composition of the Supreme Court (a 
consistent bench of nine) is different than the random, rotating three-member panels on the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals. This may influence the relationships between the judges and their interactions 
with each other. It is not as much a norm on the appellate courts for judges to interrupt one 
another, which could also factor into the dynamic in oral argument; it is more common for judge-
to-judge interruption to occur on the Supreme Court. The same could be true in legislative 
institutions, as the stakes and relationships in a partisan hearing might be different than a normal 
debate on the floor of a legislature. Future research could delve into the impact these factors have 
on interruption.  
In summary, this project is just a stepping stone in the much greater goal of improving 
disproportionate interruption of women and unbalanced gender power dynamics. Understanding 
the way women are treated in the highest echelons of their careers offers potential to improve 
and solve issues of gender inequality, both in the legal profession and beyond. Depending on 
future research that is conducted, this could shape the common practices and approaches to oral 
argument, as well as day-to-day interactions between the genders. Expanding this research has 
the potential to understand these issues and provide tangible policy solutions: whether that be 
through training in law schools or ongoing legal education requirements. For instance, if future 
research shows that male judges are disproportionately speaking during oral argument and 
dominating the conversation, rules could be implemented in order to balance the allotment of 
speaking time given to each party. On the Supreme Court, Chief Justice John Roberts effected 
the “two-minute rule,” where attorneys are supposed to have the first two minutes of oral 
 28 
argument uninterrupted. Policies such as these could be applied in order to resolve the inequities 
we see between the genders in the legal sphere. 
In conclusion, while my findings are interesting and helpful in understanding the 
relationship between interruption and power dynamics during oral argument in the U.S. Courts 
of Appeals, they are far from complete. This topic provides an opportunity for expansive 
research: looking at various circuits and time periods, or even applying these findings to another 
institution. The goal of gender equality, both in the workplace and day-to-day, is far from 
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Note: The dark gray dot on the upper left side of the box plot represents an outlier in the attorney 


























Note: The 95% confidence interval for male judge interruptions (7.37, 13.39) and 95% 
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